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ABSTRACT
“Experts” appear in the modern American courtroom on the jury
as well as in the witness box, posing a dilemma for the legal system
by offering a potentially valuable resource and an uncontrolled
source of influence. Courts give ambiguous guidance to jurors on how
they should handle their expertise in the deliberation room. On the
one hand, jurors are told that they should “decide what the facts are
from the evidence presented here in court.” By direct implication,
then, jurors should not use outside information to evaluate the
evidence. Jurors are also told, however, that they should “consider all
of the evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience.”
And indeed, all decision makers, including jurors, are unavoidably
influenced by their own backgrounds and experiences as they
evaluate evidence and reach decisions.
In this Article we examine the actual and desirable behavior
during deliberations of jurors with specialized expertise. We draw on
three sources to assess how often citizens with specialized knowledge
serve as jurors, how they behave when they do, and how legal
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professionals view the appropriateness of the contributions juror-
experts may make. Our sources include: (1) a survey of 167 experi-
enced trial attorneys who reported on their recent trial experience
with juror “experts”; (2) the actual deliberations of jurors in fifty civil
trials from the Arizona Jury Project, which revealed how real jurors
use their expertise in the jury room; and (3) a survey of 128 judges
and attorneys who evaluated examples of “expert” juror behavior.
Some scholars suggest that jurors with specialized expertise should
be excused for cause. In light of our findings, we conclude that such
drastic intervention is unwarranted and would inappropriately
undermine the increasing heterogeneity on the jury that the elimina-
tion of occupational exemptions has worked to promote. We instead
advocate a tempered response to the growing presence of juror
expertise in the jury room.
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“[W]hile the jury may leaven its deliberations with its wisdom and
experience, in doing so it must not bring extra facts into the jury
room.”
—Judge Irving Goldberg1
INTRODUCTION
Juries have become increasingly representative over time. No
longer are juries the exclusive domain of white male property-
owners deemed (by a court official) to be of good character.2
Although the modern jury is not fully representative of the commu-
nity, changes in eligibility requirements and methods of summoning
jurors have made the modern jury far more heterogeneous than it
has ever been.3 Much of the recent push for juries representing a
cross-section of the community has focused on removing racial and
gender restrictions, albeit with mixed success,4 but jury reform
efforts have also led to the elimination of most occupational
exemptions.5 If jury service is viewed as a responsibility and
opportunity that all able-bodied citizens should share, it is hard to
justify excluding citizens from service based on occupation. Consis-
tent with this view, jurors with specialized occupational expertise
are now eligible to appear on the jury as well as in the witness box
1. United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. See Neil Guzy, Citizen Participation in Juries, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 255, 255 (Wilbur R. Miller ed. 2012) (describing
the “key man” system of jury selection, whereby judicial commissioners chose white property-
owning males believed to possess “the appropriate intellect and character”).
3. See GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT
EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007), available at http:/www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media
/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx; Mary R. Rose, Access to Juries: Some
Puzzles Regarding Race and Jury Participation, 12 SOC. CRIME, LAW & DEVIANCE 119, 121-22
(2009); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A
1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999). This report was presented at the National Conference on
Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System on May 14, 1999, in Washington, D.C. 
4. See Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: Some Lessons
on Empiricism from Jury Representation Cases, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 911, 915; Rose, supra
note 3, at 122.
5. See Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment
of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community”, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 164-65 (1995).
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and, as the data we present reveal, they are appearing not only in
jury venires but also on juries.6 These jurors create a dilemma for
the legal system, offering a potentially valuable resource and an
uncontrolled source of influence.
Other changes in the trial intersect with the potential for
specialized juror expertise. Evidence in the modern American jury
trial increasingly includes scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.7 The trial court plays the role of gatekeeper when a
party proposes to have an expert testify, vetting the expert’s
credentials and the nature of the testimony being offered.8 Experts
permitted to appear as witnesses answer only legally relevant
questions posed in open court and are subject to cross-examination
by opposing counsel.9 Jurors often receive a special instruction on
how to evaluate expert testimony.10 Yet not all nonlegal expertise
that enters the jury room may come from the witness stand. Nor
may all legal expertise come from the judge. Until recently, most
states excluded from jury service individuals in particular occupa-
tions (e.g., physicians, lawyers, clergy),11 but that has changed.12 In
6. See infra Part II; see, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson, Jury of 7 Women and 5 Men Chosen
for Martoma Trial, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 9, 2014, 4:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2014/01/09/jury-of-7-women-and-5-men-chosen-for-martoma-trial (reporting that the jury
selected for the insider-trading trial of a former hedge fund manager included “an insurance
underwriter,” a law-school graduate employed by an accounting firm, and “an employment
and labor lawyer”).
7. See Damian Schofield & Ken Fowle, Technology Corner: Visualising Forensic Data:
Evidence (Part 1), 8 J. DIGITAL FORENSICS, SECURITY & L. 73 (2013).
8. For example, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the party offering the expert must
show that the expert has “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
Further, the testimony offered must be “based upon sufficient facts or data,” and must be “the
product of reliable principles and methods.” Id. Finally, the expert must have “applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Id.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 611.
10. See, e.g., STATE BAR ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 8 (5TH ED.
2013) [hereinafter ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“A witness qualified as an expert by
education or experience may state opinions on matters in that witness’s field of expertise, and
may also state reasons for those opinions. Expert opinion testimony should be judged just as
any other testimony. You are not bound by it. You may accept it or reject it, in whole or in
part, and you should give it as much credibility and weight as you think it deserves,
considering the witness’s qualifications and experience, the reasons given for the opinions,
and all the other evidence in the case.”).
11. Sobol, supra note 5, at 165 n.38.
12. See AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 54, 61 (2005), available
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recent years, states have reduced their occupational exemptions;
over half of all states now have no automatic exemptions.13 The
result is that venires are more likely to include prospective jurors
who have specialized expertise.
According to conventional wisdom, even if jurors with relevant
occupational expertise appear in the venire, they are likely to be
removed. If the judge does not excuse such jurors, the attorneys will
use peremptory challenges during jury selection to remove all jurors
whose backgrounds indicate particular expertise relevant to the
case. Nurses will be excused from cases involving medical claims;
engineers will be removed by peremptory challenge if one of the
parties plans to introduce technical engineering testimony; attor-
neys will inevitably be excused. In fact, this picture turns out to be
inaccurate. As we show in two studies reported below, the modern
American jury frequently includes jurors with relevant occupational
expertise. Moreover, some successful attorneys with extensive trial
experience may actually welcome these embedded experts to serve
on the juries they select.
Jurors typically receive no guidance on how their own expertise,
as opposed to witness expertise, should be handled. On the one
hand, jurors are told, “You will decide what the facts are from the
evidence presented here in court.”14 By direct implication, jurors
should not use outside information to evaluate the evidence. Jurors
are also told, however, that they should “[c]onsider all of the
evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience.”15
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/american_jury/final_
commentary_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf (advocating the elimination of all automatic
excuses or exemptions, noting that twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
eliminated all automatic excuses or exemptions, and noting that such eliminations in New
York increased first-time juror turnout from 33 percent to over 50 percent).
13. Id.; Shauna M. Strickland et al. eds., STATE COURT ORG., http://www.ncsc.org/sco (click
“List of Tables”; select “Trial Juries: Exemptions, Terms of Service, and Payment”; select
“Exemptions and Terms of Service”). For example, as of July 2006, Indiana eliminated all
automatic exemptions. Previously, licensed dentists and veterinarians were excused, as well
as members in active service of the armed forces, elected or appointed governmental officials,
honorary military staff officers appointed by the governor, members of the board of school
commissioners of the city of Indianapolis, and members of police or fire departments. Ind.
Pub. L. No. 1-2005 § 216 (2005) (amending IND. CODE § 33-28-4-8).
14. ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 10, at 5.
15. Id. at 7.
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Indeed, all decision makers, including jurors, are unavoidably
influenced by their own backgrounds and experiences as they
evaluate evidence and reach decisions.16 Moreover, one valuable
characteristic of the jury is the mixture of experiences that its
members bring to the task of resolving conflicting and uncertain
claims.17 What is less clear is the role that these embedded “juror-
experts”18 should play in deliberations and how other jurors should
consider the purported knowledge of these jurors who come to the
trial with specialized expertise. In this Article we explore both the
desirable range of behavior by jurors with specialized expertise and
the actual behavior of jurors with specialized expertise during jury
deliberations. Based on this investigation, we consider the appropri-
ate response of the legal system to juror expertise.
We begin in Part I by reviewing the variety of approaches courts
take when they learn that jurors have specialized knowledge that
may impact jury deliberations. In Part II we present two studies
that reveal how pervasive specialized juror knowledge has become
in the modern jury trial and provide evidence tracking the behavior
of these juror-experts during deliberations. In Part III we consider
what behavior is desirable and attainable when embedded experts
are seated on a jury. Finally, in Part IV we suggest an approach to
16. See Anne Locksely et al., The Ambiguity of Recognition Memory Tests of Schema
Theories, 16 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 421 (1984); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper,
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Vicki L. Smith &
Christina A. Studebaker, What Do You Expect?: The Influence of People’s Prior Knowledge of
Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 517 (1996); Robert P. Vallone, Lee
Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions
of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577
(1985).
17. See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 01. 597, 606 (2006) (demonstrating more thorough deliberations by racially
heterogeneous mock juries); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES
SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 148-49 (2006) (arguing that politically diverse judicial
panels increase the likelihood of effective whistleblowing while single party panels tend to go
to extremes).
18. We refer to these jurors as “juror-experts” because of their specialized knowledge
relative to others on the jury. The term “expert” is not used to imply that the juror would
qualify to testify as an expert.
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juror-experts that will avoid overreaction to a useful and democratic
development in the jury system.
I. STANDARD LEGAL CONTROLS ON SPECIALIZED JUROR
KNOWLEDGE
We begin by examining how courts typically delineate the
boundaries of appropriate juror behavior when a juror possesses
knowledge based on information gleaned outside the trial. In
evaluating court responses, it is important to recognize that courts
are reluctant to entertain any challenge to the verdict of a jury
based on what has occurred during jury deliberations.19 The
rationales are that deliberations should be free of constraint and
insulated from outside pressure and that the stability and finality
of verdicts should be protected.20 Nonetheless, when reliable
evidence emerges that jurors have sought information from external
sources during the trial—whether from people, newspapers, the
Internet, or dictionaries—trial courts generally view that juror
behavior as misconduct and may order a new trial. Similarly, if a
juror inspects the scene of an accident or the crime at issue in the
case, courts agree that the juror has not fulfilled the obligation to
draw solely on the evidence presented at trial.21 Although this
behavior reflects juror efforts to understand the evidence and to
reach well-informed verdicts, these actions are out of bounds and
can be understood as explicit violations of the court’s instructions to
the jury. Reflecting this prohibition on gathering extra-trial
information, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) recognizes evidence of
“extraneous prejudicial information [that] was improperly brought
to the jury’s attention” as a basis for inquiry into the validity of a
verdict.22 This inquiry is an exception to the usual protection
19. See James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and
Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV., 389, 427-28 (1991).
20. See id. at 393.
21. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 633 § 4 (2013).
22. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether
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extended to jury deliberations that limits the use of juror testimony
to impeach a jury verdict.23
When the specialized knowledge injected into deliberations comes
from the personal experience of a juror obtained before rather than
during trial, courts vary substantially in their response. Texas, for
example, construes outside influence narrowly, requiring that it
must come from a non-juror.24 Thus, “[e]ven a juror’s injection of his
own personal experiences, knowledge, or expertise will not be
considered as an ‘outside influence’ because such is said to emanate
from inside the jury.”25 Other courts analyze the nature of the
particular expertise but broadly construe the range of experience
that jurors may contribute during deliberations. The Arizona Court
of Appeals, characterizing a juror’s common sense and experience to
include expertise in particular subjects, found that a doctor’s
knowledge about cocaine and alcohol-induced blackouts was not
extrinsic information and thus did not warrant relief if used during
deliberations.26 Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied a
new trial to a defendant in an alleged homicide, concluding that an
engineer on the jury had not introduced extrinsic evidence when he
used his knowledge of physics and probability to calculate probabili-
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there
was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of
any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying.”).
23. See Jason R. Mudd, Note, Liberalizing the Mansfield Rule in Missouri: Making Sense
of the Extraneous Evidence Exception after Trans v. Stone, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)
(“Traditionally, courts have been very reluctant to allow jurors to impeach their own
verdicts.”).
24. See TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (permitting a juror to testify only concerning “(1) whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror; or (2) to rebut a claim that
the juror was not qualified to serve”). Texas courts have interpreted “outside influence” to
include only information not in evidence that has come from a nonjuror. Durbin v. Dal-Briar
Corp., 871 S.W.2d 263, 272 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (“ ‘Outside influence’ means a force external
to the jury and its deliberation.”); see also Crowson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 11 S.W.3d 300, 305
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
25. Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 779-800 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Soliz v. Saenz,
779 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)).
26. State v. Aguilar, 818 P.2d 165, 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); see also State v. Dickens, 926
P.2d 468, 483 (Ariz. 1996) (holding that juror mechanic’s statement that defendant’s truck
could not have overheated because there was no evidence that the motor was rusty was not
extrinsic information improperly brought into the jury room).
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ties that contradicted the testimony of the defense expert on the
likelihood that the death was an accident.27 Other courts have found
that a party waived the right to object to a juror’s use of occupation-
ally based expertise during deliberations by failing to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove that juror during jury selection.28
In contrast, some courts have responded to evidence that a juror
employed specialized knowledge by characterizing the behavior as
juror misconduct. In light of that determination, the court must
then decide whether the behavior was harmless or whether it
warrants a new trial.29 When courts do examine the nature of the
expertise employed and its likely impact during deliberations, their
analyses reveal the difficulty in balancing the value of the juror’s
contribution against its invisibility to the parties and the conse-
quent lack of control that results. Thus, in State v. Scott, during
deliberations a Marine juror used his expertise with weaponry and
ammunition to question evidence presented at trial.30 The court
determined that his discussion of the lack of penetrating power of
reloaded ammunition “extended beyond common knowledge [and]
into specialized expertise.”31 Because the juror’s contribution during
deliberations effectively explained the conflict between the experts’
theories in the State’s favor without giving the defendant an
opportunity to respond, the court found that it was misconduct that
injected specialized extrinsic evidence into deliberations and
warranted a new trial.32
The ambivalence of courts faced with evidence that jurors have
employed their specialized experience during deliberations was most
poignantly demonstrated in People v. Maragh.33 A New York trial
court was presented with evidence that two nurses on a jury had
27. State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124, 132-33 (N.M. 2002).
28. See, e.g., Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004); State v. Weaver, 917
So. 2d 600, 614 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737, 743
(Wash. App. 1990).
29. See Hill v. Lagrand Indus. Supply Co., 91 P.3d 768, 774 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that alleged misconduct did not require a new trial, amounted to no more than “oral
misconduct,” and did not amount to obstruction of justice).
30. See State v. Scott, No. 39251-4-I, 1998 WL 13013, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id.
33. 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000).
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influenced the verdict by providing “non-evidentiary assessments
regarding the volume of blood loss necessary to cause ventricular
defibrillation.”34 Expert testimony had disputed the cause of death.
The prosecution argued that the defendant had repeatedly punched
his girlfriend in the abdomen, causing substantial blood loss that
resulted in death.35 This theory relied on expert testimony that the
cause of death was blunt force trauma to the abdomen, with massive
internal bleeding.36 Defense experts testified that the reported blood
loss was inadequate to cause death and found that the ventricular
fibrillation and congested blood vessels noted in the autopsy report
“were consistent with death from an air embolism or other cardiac
event” rather than with death from a loss of blood.37 Post-trial
hearings revealed that one of the two nurse-jurors told the other
jury members that the volume of blood loss was sufficient to cause
ventricular fibrillation resulting in death.38 The other nurse-juror
“performed personal estimations of the blood volume loss and
shared them with the rest of the jury.”39 The jury convicted and the
trial court granted a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct.40
The Appellate Division reversed, based in part on a finding that
the defense had waived any objection because of what it had learned
about the nurses during jury selection.41 A further appeal to New
York’s highest court resulted in a reinstatement of the trial court’s
order directing a new trial.42 In a unanimous opinion, the New York
Court of Appeals acknowledged that “[g]enerally, a jury verdict may
not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process.43
Nonetheless, the court found a showing of improper influence that
warranted an exception to the general rule and ordered a new trial
based solely on the post-trial hearing indicating that the nurse-
jurors had improperly used their professional expertise to insert
34. Id. at 703.
35. Id. at 702.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 702-03.
38. Id. at 703.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 702.
41. People v. Maragh, 691 N.Y.S.2d 918, 918-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
42. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701, 701 (N.Y. 2000).
43. Id. at 703.
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medical opinions regarding material issues into the deliberation
process.44 The court rejected the notion that voir dire can “immunize
juror misconduct at the deliberation stage.”45 While characterizing
the jurors’ behavior as misconduct, the court acknowledged the
modern trend toward reducing professional exemptions from jury
service and the value of having professional individuals contribute
their “wisdom and life experiences to the deliberative process.”46 The
court also admitted that “[i]t would be unrealistic to expect jurors to
shed their life experiences in performing this important civic duty
just because they are professionals.”47 
Maragh palpably reflects the ambivalence of the legal system
about juror expertise, expressed as courts strive to provide guidance
and support competent jury performance, while at the same time
exercising restraint and avoiding interference with the deliberations
of a valued democratic institution. The result is a lack of clarity
reflected in the various “rules” courts purport to use in drawing the
distinction between legitimate use of specialized knowledge and
illegitimate use. The following is a sampling of these “rules”:
(1) Juror background knowledge is permitted up to the point at
which it would be considered “specialized knowledge” and hence
would require the testimony of an expert witness instead of a lay
witness under Rules 701 and 702.48
44. Id. at 703-05.
45. Id. at 706.
46. Id. at 705 (citing Judith S. Kaye, A Judge’s Perspective on Jury Reform from the Other
Side of the Jury Box, 36 JUDGES’ J., Fall no. 4, 1997, at 21).
47. Id.
48. Compare State v. Briggs, 776 P.2d 1347, 1355-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (finding juror
misconduct when a juror did not disclose his personal experience with speech problems when
questioned about the general topic on voir dire and then discussed that experience with other
jurors in deliberations), and State v. Scott, 89 Wash. App. 1064, No. 3925-1-4-I, 1998 WL
130013, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding juror misconduct when a juror who revealed
his military training during voir dire did not disclose his specialized knowledge about
ammunition because he was not specifically asked about it, and then discussed it with other
jurors in deliberations), with Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 796 P.2d 737, 743 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1990) (finding no juror misconduct when a juror with medical training that was
revealed during voir dire used specialized knowledge about the potential cause of a birth
defect to interpret evidence admitted at trial). See generally FED. R. EVID. 701; FED. R. EVID.
702.
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(2) “Jurors may draw inferences ... where such inferences are
within the common experience of the average person” and not
where the inferences are outside common knowledge.49
(3) Jurors “may not validly render a verdict on the particular
knowledge of individual jurors.”50
(4) “Jurors may rely on their common sense and life’s experience
during deliberations. This knowledge may include expertise that
a juror may have on a certain subject.”51
(5) If a juror’s assertions merely reflect evidence and arguments
presented in the trial, they are less egregious than other juror
actions that warrant a new trial.52
(6) If a juror’s legal knowledge is not specific to the factual
circumstances presented in the case, that knowledge is not
prejudicial extraneous information.53
(7) “Jurors may use their background, including professional and
educational experiences, to inform their deliberations so long as
they do not introduce legal content or specific factual informa-
tion learned from outside the record.”54
49. Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 876 P.2d 154, 157 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that knowledge of the properties of specialized running shoes versus other types of footwear
is not common knowledge).
50. Reed v. Cent. Main Power Co., 172 A. 823, 826 (Me. 1934).
51. State v. Heitkemper, 538 N.W.2d 561, 563-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no
improper use of extraneous information when pharmacist told other jurors, based on his
professional opinion, that the defense witness “was untruthful about the drug she took
because the quantities she testifies she took would have knocked her out”).
52. In re Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 486-87 (Cal. 1996) (finding no improper influence in
psychologist’s discussion of the accuracy of the polygraph evidence presented at trial).
53.  See Leavitt v. Magid, 598 N.W.2d 722, 728 (Neb. 1999) (finding no improper use of
extraneous information when an attorney-juror’s discussion of proximate cause was general
legal knowledge and not specific to the factual circumstances presented in the case).
54. Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Colo. 2011).
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These examples of guidelines for determining the legitimate
boundaries for the use of juror expertise display a lack of clarity
that is reflected in the varied and ambivalent response these
appellate courts display when presented with evidence that jurors
have used their specialized expertise during deliberations. More-
over, perhaps recognizing the murkiness of the boundaries, courts
do not attempt to communicate these guidelines for appropriate
behavior to the jurors, who are instead expected to divine the proper
dividing line between appropriate and inappropriate behavior based
on specialized expertise.55
II. SPECIALIZED JUROR KNOWLEDGE IN THE MODERN JURY TRIAL
Appellate cases can offer only a glimpse at the occurrence and use
of specialized juror knowledge on the modern American jury. We
learn about such cases only if someone has disclosed what occurred
during deliberations and an appeal has ensued. Thus, a survey of
appellate cases provides no indication of how often jurors with
specialized expertise appear on juries and only indirect information
on the role that expertise has actually played during deliberations.
To address the first question—how often jurors with specialized
expertise appear on juries—we collected data from two sources. The
first is a survey of experienced trial attorneys who were asked about
the occupational make up of the jury in their most recent jury trial.
The second is a unique study of fifty civil jury trials in Tucson,
Arizona, where we were able to question jurors on their relevant
case-specific expertise. In addition, because we were permitted to
videotape the actual jury deliberations, we were able to examine the
behavior of the embedded juror-experts in the deliberations in these
55. An exception to the general absence of instruction on how jurors should handle
specialized expertise arises in trials involving the use of interpreters. Jurors often receive a
specific instruction that they must accept the official interpreter’s translation of non-English
testimony even if they disagree with it. See, e.g., DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 3.8 (2000) (“Languages
other than English may be used during this trial. The evidence you are to consider is only that
provided through the official court interpreter. Although some of you may know the non-
English language used, it is important that all jurors consider the same evidence. Therefore,
you must base your decision on the evidence presented in the English interpretation. You
must disregard any different meaning of the non-English words.”).
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fifty civil trials.56 We begin with a description of the survey of
experienced trial attorneys conducted at their national conference.
A. Trial Attorney Survey
At the annual meeting of a prestigious invitation-only organiza-
tion of experienced trial attorneys who represent plaintiffs and
defendants in civil cases, as well as the government and criminal
defendants in criminal cases, one of us (S.D.) was invited to speak
about juries. With the permission of the Executive Board of the
organization, members of the audience were asked to complete a
survey, which included questions about their last jury trial.
Approximately half the members of the audience completed the
survey, producing a sample of 167 attorney respondents who had
tried an average of eighty jury trials each.57
Respondents were asked to think about their last jury trial and
to indicate occupations represented on the jury.58 Table 1 shows the
question and the pattern of responses.
56. Pam Mueller’s research assistance on the topic of juror experts and coding of
deliberations was invaluable.
57. Eligible respondents were attorneys who reported on the composition of the jury in
their last trial. The survey asked whether the respondent was an attorney. Twenty-seven
respondents were not included in the analyses: two judicial respondents, five non-lawyers,
nine respondents who did not indicate whether they were lawyers, ten lawyers who did not
answer the questions about their last jury trial, and one additional respondent whose answers
were illegible.
58. The question was phrased: “Please think back to the jurors on your most recent jury
trial. Please indicate whether anyone on the jury, including alternates, was (check all that
apply): [followed by the list of occupations that appear in Table 1].”
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Table 1. Occupations of Jurors on Your Last Jury Trial
Please think back to the jurors on your most recent jury trial. Please indicate
whether anyone on the jury, including alternates, was (check all that apply):
N Percent Occupation
1 0.6 physician
36 21.6 nurse or medical technician
16 9.6 attorney
26 15.6 paralegal or legal secretary
51 30.5 mechanic
15 9.0 scientist
51 30.5 therapist or social worker
46 27.5 accountant
32 19.2 insurance company employee
17 10.2 had other occupational expertise, specify _______________
Note: Average listed occupations: 342/167 = 2 per case
Although the attorneys reported that they rarely had physicians
on their juries, their most recent trials, contrary to expectation,
were heavily populated with jurors who had occupational expertise
that could have been relevant in at least some types of trial. To test
whether jurors with case-relevant occupations were avoided when
that potential expertise was applicable to a case, we looked at
selection patterns attorneys reported for trials when there was a
match between the juror’s occupation and the nature of the case.59
More specifically, we examined whether the attorneys avoided
59. After asking about the presence of juror-experts in their last jury trial (Table 1), we
asked the attorneys: “What was the general nature of the case?” and offered the following
choices: “criminal, medical malpractice, products liability, other tort, contract, or other
(specify).”
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jurors with medical expertise in medical malpractice cases, or more
broadly in tort cases, and whether they avoided jurors with
engineering or mechanical expertise in products liability cases
(Table 2).
Table 2. Selection Patterns for Jurors with 
Potentially Relevant Expertise
Juror
Occupation
Case Type
% of Case Type
with this Juror
Expertise
% of All Other
Case Types with
this Juror 
Expertise
p-level
Medical Medical Malpractice 31.0% (29) 19.6% (138) .172
Medical Tort 27.8% (90) 14.3%   (77) .035
Engineering/
Mechanical 
Products
Liability 72.2% (18)  48.3% (149) .055
Note: Based on data from n = 167 attorneys. Numbers in parentheses refer to the total
number of most-recent trials of that case type.
In light of the small number of cases for each of the specialized
categories, it is not surprising that two of the three comparisons in
Table 2 were not statistically significant at the conventional level of
p<.05. What is surprising is that all three comparisons showed
patterns that actually tilted in favor of retaining jurors with
expertise, contradicting the common wisdom that says such jurors
will be swiftly removed. Could it be that these experienced veteran
trial attorneys were actually selecting for juror expertise? To the
extent that an attorney believes that the weight of the technical
evidence favors her client, she may not be inclined to remove a
prospective juror whose background suggests expertise. If both
attorneys believe that the evidence is in their favor, the juror will
remain.60 Whether trial attorneys are actively selecting jurors with
60. In rejecting a claim on appeal that a juror-mechanic brought improper expertise to
deliberations in a products liability case, one appellate court observed that the parties were
aware of his background, noting, “The trial court stated: ‘None of the parties struck him and
they obviously assumed he would bring something to their overall discussion of the case which
is drawn from his own experience and knowledge.’” Christman v. Isuzu, No. 97-2211, 1998 WL
249017, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. May 19, 1998).
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relevant expertise or merely not actively attempting to remove
them, this evidence indicates that the appearance of an embedded
expert on the jury is neither a fluke nor the product of inexperienced
lawyering. Nor is it confined to trials handled by elite attorneys, as
the evidence below from the Arizona Jury Project shows.
B. The Arizona Jury Project
1. The Background of the Project
The Arizona Jury Project, in which we observed actual jury
deliberations, presented a unique occasion to observe how jurors
with occupational expertise behave during jury deliberations.61 The
opportunity to study these jury deliberations arose because an
innovative group of judges and attorneys in Arizona, encouraged by
the Arizona Supreme Court, took a close look at their jury system.62
As a result, Arizona decided to make some changes aimed at
facilitating jury performance, including a controversial innovation
instructing jurors that they were permitted to discuss the case
among themselves during breaks in the trial.63 To evaluate the
effect of allowing discussions, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an
order permitting a team of researchers to conduct a randomized
experiment in which jurors in some cases were instructed that they
could discuss the case and jurors in other cases were given the
traditional admonition not to discuss the case.64 The court order also
permitted us to videotape the jury discussions and deliberations.65
61. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Jury Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an
Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003).
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 16-17.
65. See id. at 17 n.39. See also id. at 17, for a detailed report on the permissions and
security measures the project required, and the results of the evaluation. As part of their
obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme Court Order as well as additional assurances
to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal investigators, the authors of this Article
have changed certain details to disguise individual cases. The changes do not, however, affect
the substantive nature of the findings that are reported.
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2. Selection of Jurors and Cases
The jurors, attorneys, and parties were promised that the tapes
would be viewed only by the researchers and only for research
purposes.66 Jurors were told about the videotaping project when
they arrived at court for their jury service.67 If they preferred not to
participate, they were assigned to cases not involved in the project.68
The juror participation rate was over 95 percent.69 Attorneys and
litigants were less willing to take part in the study.70 Some attor-
neys were generally willing to participate when they had a case
before one of the participating judges; others consistently refused.71
The result was a 22 percent yield among otherwise eligible trials.72
3. Data Collection and the Final Sample
In addition to videotaping the discussions and deliberations, we
also videotaped the trials themselves and collected the exhibits,
juror questions submitted during trial, jury instructions, and verdict
forms.73 In addition, the jurors, attorneys, and judge completed
questionnaires at the end of the trial.74 The fifty cases in the study
reflected the usual mix of cases dealt with by state courts: twenty-
six motor vehicle cases (52 percent), four medical malpractice cases
(8 percent), seventeen other tort cases (34 percent), and three
contract cases (6 percent).75 The forty-seven tort cases in the sample
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Although we cannot be certain that the cameras had no effect on their behavior during
deliberations, the behavior during deliberations at times included comments that the jurors
presumably would not have wanted the judges or attorneys to hear. See id. at 22-23 (providing
excerpts of comments by jurors).
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id.
75. Id. This distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil jury trials for the Pima
County Superior Court for the year 2001: 62 percent motor vehicle tort cases, 8 percent
medical malpractice cases, 23 percent other tort cases, and 6 percent contract cases. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001,
NAT’L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUST. DATA, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
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varied from the common rear-end collision with a claim of soft tissue
injury to cases involving severe and permanent injury or death.76
Awards ranged from $1000 to $2.8 million, with a median award of
$25,500.77
4. The Data
a. The Trials
We transcribed the opening and closing arguments in each case
from the trial videotape.78 We also created a very detailed “road-
map” of the trial from the videotaped trial.79
b. Data from the Deliberations
 We created verbatim transcripts of all deliberations,80 producing
5276 pages of deliberation transcripts for the fifty trials. The
deliberations consisted of 78,864 comments by the jurors, each of
which was coded on a variety of dimensions. A comment, akin to a
turn, was defined as a statement or partial statement that contin-
ued until the speaker stopped talking or until another speaker’s
statement or partial statement began. If another speaker inter-
rupted, but the original speaker continued talking, the continuation
was treated as part of the initial comment.81 For example, here
Juror 2 is in mid-sentence when Juror 4 interrupts to agree before
Juror 2 completes his comment:
Juror 2: Negligence and cause of death … [are] also in the fact
of what you don’t do—
Juror 4: I, I agree.
Juror 2: to prevent it.
NACJD/studies/03957/version/3 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
76. Diamond et al., supra note 61, at 18-19.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The project originally created quasi-transcripts of the deliberations for initial
analyses. Id. at 19-20. We later produced verbatim transcripts to obtain a complete
representation of what jurors said during deliberations.
81. Id. at 61 n.90.
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In this instance, Juror 2 was credited with one comment and
Juror 4 was credited with one comment.
c. Post-trial Questionnaires
At the end of the trial, each juror and judge completed a question-
naire about the trial and their reactions to it.82 One of the questions
jurors answered on the questionnaire was whether there was
anything in their background that had given them particular
knowledge or expertise in serving as a juror in the case.
5. Jurors and Their Expertise
One in five jurors claimed on their questionnaire that they had
some relevant expertise. The deliberations reveal that the jurors
often cited that expertise or drew on it to justify their positions. Not
all of these claims of expertise, however, reflect occupational or
education-based expertise. Some of the sources of particular know-
ledge that the jurors identified would fall in the category of ordinary
common sense or experience (e.g., “I drive,” or “I am a parent”).
Jurors often refer to, and indeed are expected to draw on, their more
general personal experiences to provide a context for the evidence
or a basis for evaluating the plausibility of a claim.83 Thus, in a case
in which some jurors expressed skepticism about the severity of a
plaintiff ’s injury in view of his stoic testimony in describing the
event, another juror attributed it to a male tendency not to express
emotion, claiming that she was very familiar with that tendency
because she grew up with four brothers. In another case, jurors were
impatient with a plaintiff ’s decision to go to a chiropractor rather
than a medical doctor and her failure to fill the prescription given
to her in the emergency room. One of the jurors offered a potential
explanation: “I’m Mexican [by heritage] and some Mexican people
will only go to chiropractors, not MDs and [they] don’t like taking
drugs.” In the normal flow of conversation in the deliberation room,
jurors often refer to prior accidents and injuries, those they
82. Id. at 18.
83. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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personally experienced, as well as those of friends or relatives.84
They discuss the kind of activity that can lead to carpal tunnel
syndrome, whether it is possible to remove a neck brace for a short
time without causing further injury, whether chiropractors are
typically open during the evening hours, or why someone might take
steroids other than to build muscle. The jurors drawing on such
experience may or may not convince others that their experience or
the knowledge they claim is relevant or accurate, and their fellow
jurors may or may not accept what the juror says as providing a
legitimate basis for the claim. As in conversation outside the jury
room, speakers draw on their experiences and listeners find what
they say to be useful or irrelevant.
Jurors who have occupational or educational expertise, however,
have more than the usual content of common experience, and can
offer a credential that may bolster the credibility of their comments.
That is not to say that a juror with a specified occupational or
educational background would qualify as a testifying expert, but
rather that the juror can draw on, and point to, relevant training or
occupation-related experience that is different from, and presum-
ably superior to, that of the average jury member. More than half of
the jurors (forty-nine of eighty-two) who reported on the post-
deliberation questionnaire that they had particular knowledge or
expertise mentioned a case-related occupational or educational basis
for the expertise. That number amounts to 12.2 percent of the total
sample, an average of one juror per eight-member jury. If we add to
that number the forty-six jurors whose occupations indicated
relevant expertise, but who did not cite it as a source of relevant
expertise on the questionnaire, a total of ninety-five—24 percent of
the jurors and an average of two jurors per eight-member
jury—began their deliberations with potentially relevant occupa-
tional expertise.85 The most common form of relevant expertise was
medical (n=36), ranging from nurses and nursing assistants to
84. Our focus in this Article is on occupational and education-based expertise. In future
analyses, we will examine juror use of personal experiences that do not implicate specialized
quasi-expertise because they are not occupation or education-based.
85. We considered the occupational background of the juror relevant only if the case
involved issues that touched on the juror’s area of expertise. Thus, a medical background was
not relevant in a property tort case in which no personal injury was alleged.
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radiation therapists and a Ph.D. physiologist. Next was the category
that included engineers and jurors in occupations dealing with
vehicles (n=21; e.g., mechanics, truck drivers). These jurors had
specialized occupational knowledge relevant to cases involving
automobile accidents. A third category consisted of jurors with some
legal background (n=19; e.g., attorney, legal secretary, “took courses
in law”). Some jurors also had financial expertise that was relevant
in cases in which financial transactions were at issue (n=7). The
remaining juror-experts had a variety of other case-related work
backgrounds (n=12; e.g. a volunteer first aid worker in a case
involving safety training; a restaurant worker in a case involving a
restaurant).
The presence of this potential resource on the jury is not lost on
the other jurors. Indeed, a juror need not explicitly refer to his or
her source of expertise during deliberations. The jurors have an
opportunity during jury selection to hear about the occupations of
their fellow jurors, a familiarity that may be reinforced as the jurors
share that information during breaks in the trial. As a result, jurors
sometimes specifically turn to another juror for professional
expertise. In a case involving how patients were handled by a clinic,
a juror wanted to know whether it was common practice to call
patients who don’t come back to pick up their medication and said,
“Let’s hear from the pharmacist.” In an auto accident case involving
a dispute over how the accident occurred, a juror asked, “As an
engineer, what do you think?”
In some cases, jurors were hesitant to share their expertise
during deliberations. Thus, one juror turned to a nurse on the jury
who was examining some of the exhibits and asked, “Are those the
medical records?” The juror responded, “Um-hum. I’m not here as an
expert witness, so I won’t bore you with my opinions.” In several
cases, a juror-expert provided useful—and relevant—information.
These juror-experts substantially added to the competence of the
jury by translating some of the technical material that experts on
the witness stand failed to clarify, promoting educational (versus
deferential) evaluation of the expert testimony.86 Here is an example
86. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference
or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1146-47 (1993).
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from a juror-engineer (Juror 1) describing the testimony of the
testifying engineer-experts:
Juror 1: If you’re rear-ended, the first thing you do—
Jurors 5 and 7 interrupt: You go backwards.
Juror 1: You go backwards, but then you get the recoil going
forward. And that’s when the seatbelt catches you and stops you.
What [the experts are] having arguments on—
Juror 7: [interrupting] Is whether he went forward first?
Juror 1: Is, one ... did [the plaintiff ’s car] go forward instantly?
Did it accelerate? If it accelerated, you get the same thing ... it’s
like you’ve been rear-ended: you’re going to go back first and
then go forward, recoil. If you all of a sudden decelerate, that
means the car keeps going forward, I mean, the car also stops,
but you’re going to keep on going forward. And that’s when
you’re going to hit. And the engineer was claiming that the time
before they actually hit, when they crumpled each other and
then when they started to turn, the time it took to crumple, the
car was absorbing energy and—
Juror 5: [interrupting] That’s when he went forward.
Juror 1: He had enough time to go forward before the car started
turning. That’s why when I asked those questions, he said “No,
no, he’ll have time to go forward and [injure himself] before he
starts going forward and backwards,” which I don’t know is truly
the case.
Juror 5: But I think the question we were hearing from the other
side is: if the hit was like this [uses hands to indicate diagonal
impact at side of car], doesn’t the [striking car] contribute some
more energy to that sort of general forward movement in the
car? Because it’s not at right angles, and it’s not head-on.
Juror 1: My general impression is that that’s true. If you have
something going at an angle [makes same diagonal diagram
with his hands], you have some motion going perpendicular to
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the car and you have some motion going along the car. And when
you get hit, you get shoved [uses hands to indicate motion to the
side] and you also get shoved forward. And, at least for a short
while, before friction, your car would actually go forward for a
little while as it got hit, and you would go back. And that’s why
I was asking him and I was, like, “That seems a little strange.”
And he’s saying there’s something actually happening in
between, while it’s crumpling. And he didn’t make that particu-
larly clear.
Other jurors with relevant occupational expertise provided little
instruction but offered strong opinions. In a low impact collision, the
driver of one vehicle failed to stop and slammed into the automobile
he was following. The plaintiff claimed soft tissue injury and sued
to recover for the cost of past and future chiropractor expenses,
along with pain and suffering. A key question in the case was the
speed at which the impact occurred, in light of the damage to the
vehicles. Both the plaintiff and the defendant called experts in
accident reconstruction who calculated their estimates based on the
statements of the plaintiff and defendant on how far the vehicles
moved in the course of the collision and the damage to the vehicles.
The defendant admitted negligence, but denied that the plaintiff
was injured in the collision. The attorneys removed two mechanics
during voir dire, but retained an artist/mechanic who worked with
metal. After two other jurors expressed their views that the plain-
tiff’s injuries were overstated, the artist offered a series of opinions
on the plausibility of the two expert witnesses based on his experi-
ence and his own analysis of the pictures of the vehicles involved in
the accident:
First of all, I’ve been a mechanic, raised in it my whole life. I’ve
also been exposed to welding with metals… he said that bumper
was .1 in thickness, which is not very thick. My guess is it is
probably 13 gauge, which is a thin metal. Now the metal of the
back end is even thinner than that. Now, I don’t know if you
notice, but when you are on the road, and you see an accident,
these little cars wad up. The engineers design the cars to absorb
as much energy as possible as opposed to in the old days. So I’m
not impressed by the back end being bent. You could dent it with
a bicycle.... So they wanted us to believe that a majority of the
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back of their car was damaged. My own guesstimation—maybe
forty percent or less. Just the very left corner .... [A]nd his hook
[on the defendant’s vehicle] may have penetrated the bumper.
Well, I fool around with metal all day and it don’t take much to
bend a 13 inch gauge.
The other members of the jury did not dispute this analysis,
although their silence does not necessarily indicate that they
accepted the juror’s evaluation. The position he was advocating was
consistent with the assessment offered in more esoteric terms by the
defense expert, whose testimony the jury discussed with approval.
To provide an overall assessment of the behavior of the juror-
experts during deliberations, we developed a number of measures
designed to reflect activity level, influence, and contributions to
deliberations. The comparisons between juror-experts and other
jurors on these measures are presented in Table 3:
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Table 3. Participation Measures for Juror-Experts and
Nonexperts During Deliberations87
Index of Participation
Behavior Juror-Experts
Non-
expert
Jurors
p-level
Controlling for
Participation
Level
% Comments this Juror
Contributed of Total Com-
ments on this Jury (over-
all participation level)
14.6% 11.9%
tpr, 43 df
=2.63,
p=.012
---
Participation sub-types:
% of Correct Instruction
References this Juror
Con-tributed of Total 
Correct References on
this Jury
 16.0%  11.7%
tpr, 42 df
=2.48,
p=.017 
Becomes
nonsignificant
87. In the forty-four cases with juror-experts (351 jurors, including 95 juror-experts),
except as otherwise indicated. Results in the middle three columns of this table reflect paired
t-tests, conducted on the total mean percentages (or, for self-rated influence, the averaged
means) for experts on the jury versus the nonexperts on that same jury. We conducted paired
tests on group-level means so that each jury would have one observation each for the experts
and nonexperts on a given jury-group, thus satisfying the requirement that all observations
across the pairs be independent.
Hierarchical mixed models provide another method for analyzing data that are
nonindependent, or “nested” (jurors are nested within jury groups). That approach attempts
to estimate simultaneously both the individual-level variability in the outcome and the group-
level variability. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL
LINEAR MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 3-4 (2d ed. 2002). However, such
models are problematic to use on the type of variables analyzed here, which not only have few
observations for each group (and therefore low power to estimate group-level variability), but
also tend to produce so-called “negative intraclass correlations.” See David A. Kenny et al.,
The Statistical Analysis of Data from Small Groups, 83 J. PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 126,
128 (2002). In these instances, grouping tends to exaggerate differences within a group, rather
than—as is more typical—to make group members more alike. See id. The iterative maximum
likelihood estimation procedures used in these models sometimes do not converge and
therefore fail to provide any estimates, which was our experience in analysis of nearly all the
variables listed in Table 3. Where models did converge on a solution, results always
substantively confirmed the paired t-test results. To control for participation, we used a
combination of linear and mixed-model methods.
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Table 3 cont.
Index of Participation
Behavior
Juror-
Experts
Non-
expert
Jurors
p-level
Controlling for
Participation
Level
% of Incorrect References
to Jury Instructions this
Juror Contributed of
Total Incorrect
References on this Jury 
 16.2%
 
 11.2%
tpr, 41 df
=3.29,
p=.002
Becomes
nonsignificant
% of Corrections to
Inaccurate Instruction
References this Juror
Contributed of Correc-
tions made on this Jury*
 16.5%  10.9%
tpr, 39 df
=1.79,
p=.081
Becomes
nonsignificant
% Comments about
Experts this Juror
Contributed of Total
Comments about Experts
on this Jury**
 14.8%  11.3%
tpr, 35 df
=2.25,
p=.031 
Becomes a trend
effect(p < .10)
% Calls to Vote this Juror
Contributed of Total Calls
to Vote on this Jury 
15.4%  11.9%
tpr, 43 df
=1.06,
p=.293
Remains
nonsignificant
% Probes this Juror
Contributed of Total
Probes on this Jury
14.7% 11.9%
tpr, 39 df
=.995,
p=.326 
Remains
nonsignificant
Source of the First
Verdict Proposal 
(probability)
 .179  .105
tpr, 43 df
=1.52,
p=.136 
Remains
nonsignificant
Source of the Final Actual
Verdict (probability) .112  .125
tpr, 43 df
 =-.305,
p=.762 
Remains
nonsignificant
Source of First Valenced
Comment (probability)  .133  .122
tpr, 43 df
=.25,
p=.803
Remains
nonsignificant
*In the forty cases with corrected instructions and juror-experts (319 jurors, including 86
juror-experts).
**In the thirty-six cases with expert witnesses and juror-experts (290 jurors, including 78
juror-experts).
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The behavior of the juror-experts and the other jurors differed on
several of these measures, but was remarkably similar on others.
On average, the juror-experts were more active than nonexperts,
contributing a significantly greater percentage of comments than
jurors without relevant occupational/educational expertise: 14.6
percent versus 11.9 percent on average, a 23 percent higher rate of
activity compared to the nonexpert jurors. And they tended to be
more active on a range of activities, contributing significantly more
correct references to jury instructions as well as more incorrect
references, with a trend toward contributing more corrections for
instruction errors made by other jurors. They also contributed
significantly more comments on expert witnesses. The first three of
these differences, however, were bound up in the overall greater
activity of the juror-experts: as described in the results in the last
column of the table, when we controlled for overall juror activity, all
three differences relating to jury instructions became nonsignificant.
In contrast, the greater focus on expert testimony by the juror-
experts persisted, although it was reduced to a trend. The dispropor-
tionate commentary from juror-experts on testifying experts is
precisely the double-edged sword that lurks in the benefits juror-
experts can offer and in the concerns raised about undue influence
from juror-experts. As jurors who are more familiar and comfortable
with the content of the testimony, these juror-experts are in a
position to explain what others might find difficult, just as the juror
did in the lengthy quotation above. But juror-experts may also
influence other jurors’ assessments of the testifying expert based
merely on their apparent knowledge, and such influence would be
the result of opinions untested in court during the trial.
The other measures reveal surprisingly little evidence that as a
group the juror-experts exerted a particularly powerful influence
during deliberations. For example, one way that jurors can play a
leadership role is to call for a vote, attempting to move the group
toward a verdict. As might be expected, forepersons were more
likely than other jurors to call for a vote, on average initiating five
times as many calls to vote as nonforepersons. But juror-experts
were no more likely to become forepersons than nonexperts.88
88. See Table 4 infra.
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Moreover, juror-experts were no more likely to initiate calls for a
vote than were nonexperts.
Another potential method jurors could use to guide deliberations
was at the individual juror-to-juror level, by probing another juror
for their viewpoint (e.g., “Why did you vote that way?” or “What do
you think about an award of $10,000?”). Juror-experts did not take
on a greater leadership role in deliberations by disproportionately
probing the views of the other jurors.
Another way to influence group decision making is to propose a
decision the group might adopt. Yet juror-experts were no more
likely than the other members of their jury to offer the first
suggested verdict,89 to propose a verdict that the jury ultimately
adopted, or even to offer the first comment during deliberations that
favored one party over the other (i.e., the first valenced comment).
Measures not reflecting level of juror participation, too, as Table
4 shows, revealed no evidence of substantial influence from the
juror-experts based on an aura of authority stemming from their
greater expertise. 
89. Possible verdict categories included liability verdicts, comparative fault percentage
allocations, and damage awards. 
2014] EMBEDDED EXPERTS 915
Table 4. Non-Participation Measures of Juror-Experts and
Nonexpert Jurors During Deliberations
Nature of 
Non-Participation
Measure
Juror-experts Nonexpertjurors p-level
Self-rated Influence*  4.44  4.26 tpr, 40df =1.04,p=.306 
Foreperson (probability)  .140  .126 tpr, 43 df =0.26,p=.799 
Holdout (probability)**  .339  .210 tpr, 14 df =1.31,p=.213 
Average % of Juror’s
Own Comments that
were Valenced 
 43.9%  43.0% tpr, 43 df =0.66,p=.513
Average % of Juror’s
Own Valenced
Comments that were
Mixed
 4.3%  3.3% tpr, 43 df =1.70,p=.097
One-sided Jurors—90%
or more Valenced Com-
ments in favor of one
Party (probability)
 .106  .191
 tpr, 43 df
=-2.51,
p=.016
*This analysis is based on the 322 jurors who completed this post-trial questionnaire measure.
The 1 to 7 scale goes from 1 (not at all influential) to 7 (extremely influential). These jurors
came from forty-one cases.
**In the fifteen cases with nonunanimous verdicts and juror-experts (121 jurors, including 33
juror-experts).
Juror-experts and nonexperts did not differ on their self-rated
influence as reported on the postdeliberation questionnaires
(averaging 4.44 versus 4.26 on a 7-point scale). Self-reports can of
course be notoriously unreliable, particularly when self-assessment
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is involved.90 Here, however, the lack of difference in self-reported
influence was also reflected in observable behavioral measures,
including selection as foreperson. Moreover, if the juror-experts
were disproportionately successful in influencing their fellow jurors
in a more subtle fashion, they should have been able to avoid ending
up as holdouts when a final verdict was reached.91 Yet, if anything,
these juror-experts were more likely to be holdouts on the
nonunanimous juries than were their fellow jurors.
Given their greater level of activity, the juror-experts might have
been able to exert undue influence if they were particularly
opinionated and had strongly advocated for one of the parties. We
used three measures to assess the extent to which juror-experts
expressed strong views during deliberations, comparing the juror-
experts and nonexperts on the contributions they made to delibera-
tions that favored one of the parties. We coded the valence of each
comment in the context of the discussion occurring at the time and
in the context of the entire case, assessing whether the observation
favored one of the parties. We defined a valenced remark as any
comment that one of the parties would, and the opposing party
would not, want a juror to say.92 If a remark was mixed in that it
included some material favorable to both parties or unfavorable to
both, it was valenced for both. A total of 24,402 comments were
coded as valenced using this basic valenced coding system.93
90. See Barbara O'Brien et al., Ask and What Shall Ye Receive? A Guide for Using and
Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 201, 227-28 (2011).
91. The decision rule for civil juries in Arizona requires six of the eight jurors to agree in
order to reach a verdict. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 21-102 (2013). If the jury is not unanimous
at the end of the deliberations, only those jurors agreeing with the verdict sign the verdict
form. REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) Standard 8 (4d. 2005). We refer to the
others as the “holdouts.”
92. For example, the following comment was coded as a pro-plaintiff valenced statement:
“But I think he [the plaintiff] really was in pain.” In contrast, the following comment was
coded as a pro-defendant valenced statement: “She [the plaintiff] didn’t follow the instructions
that [the hospital] gave her. Because right here it says, uh, [juror pages through a document],
oh, ‘as soon as possible make an appointment to see the doctor in two days.’”
93. Mixed comments with material favorable or unfavorable to both sides were weighted
.5 for each side. The basic valenced coding system was developed to assess balance and
extremity in jury deliberations. The coding system produced good reliability. Two coders
independently coded two full transcripts. For each coding category, we created an index of
agreement following the procedure described by Charles P. Smith consisting of twice the
number of agreements on a category divided  by the sum of the frequency that each coder used
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In addition, jurors made comments that simply advocated a
particular amount or range in dollars (e.g., $10,000) or a metric for
damages (e.g., two months of lost wages). These comments required
a context to interpret as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant, so we used
the final verdict as the reference. We characterized the amount as
pro-plaintiff if it exceeded the amount the jury actually awarded (in
total or in the category to which it applied) and as pro-defendant if
it was less than that final amount. This reference point thus
distinguished the amounts favored by the members of the jurors
who would have given more than the jury eventually did from the
amounts favored by the other jurors who would have given less than
the jury eventually did. Because juries rarely returned damages
that approached what plaintiffs requested,94 however, some of the
“pro-plaintiff ” suggestions were only modestly favorable to the
plaintiff in the case. An additional 1254 comments were valenced on
this measure, for a total of 25,656 valenced comments.95
The juror-experts on average did not contribute a higher propor-
tion of valenced comments than did the nonexperts. To the extent
that valenced comments are sources of persuasion, either by
emphasizing a particular piece of evidence or by interpreting the
facts in a way that favors one party, the similar proportion of
valenced comments contributed by juror-experts and nonexperts
provides no evidence that the juror-experts disproportionately
engaged in these persuasive efforts.
Two other ways of using these valenced contributions allowed us
to assess the balance and complexity of contributions jurors made
the category. See Charles P. Smith, Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 313, 313-27 (Harry T. Reis
& Charles M. Judd eds., 2000). Comments valenced in favor of the defendant had indices of
.82 and .85; the indices for comments valenced for the plaintiff were .62 and .85; for comments
valenced for both, .55 and .66 (this category was assigned no more than ten times in each of
the two transcripts). The remaining categories in the coding system (e.g., comment was
neutral or ambiguous) all had comparable indices.
94. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John Meixner, Damage
Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148, 173-74 (2011).
95. An additional 16,328 juror comments could not be valenced because the comments
were fragments (e.g., “I just can’t believe ...”), mere utterances (e.g., “Um-hum”) or ambiguous
(e.g., “Oh my god ...”). With these comments excluded, 62,536 substantive comments
remained, of which 41 percent were valenced (43 percent for the cases with juror-experts that
appear in Table 4).
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to deliberation: the frequency of a juror’s mixed comments and
whether the juror’s comments tended to be one-sided. The frequency
of mixed comments reflects the extent to which jurors offered more
complex evaluations of the evidence, making mixed comments that
included points favorable or unfavorable to both sides. Although
only 3.8 percent of all juror valenced comments in the forty-four
cases with at least one juror-expert were mixed, juror-experts
offered somewhat more mixed comments than did nonexperts (4.3
percent v. 3.3 percent, p < .10).
One-sided jurors constitute the other extreme, discussing the
evidence in terms that entirely favor one party. It is sometimes
claimed that jurors enter deliberations at the end of trial with a firm
and monolithic view favoring one side or the other.96 Deliberations
then consist of a conversation with a preordained outcome: the
majority persuades or browbeats the minority into changing their
position. Our work with these fifty jury deliberations suggests a
more complex and important role for deliberations, perhaps because
most jurors do not appear to have reached closure as deliberations
begin. Yet some jurors do consistently express a single view
throughout deliberations.
We identified jurors as demonstrating a one-sided approach if 90
percent or more of their valenced comments favored one party.
These jurors constituted 15 percent of all jurors.97 A more evenly
divided distribution of valenced comments provided evidence that
the juror was engaging in more complex thinking and deliberation.
Thus, if a juror said that the inconsistency between the defendant’s
deposition and trial testimony made him less believable—something
that favored the plaintiff—but also argued that the evidence showed
the defendant’s behavior was reasonable under the circumstances,
the juror would be showing a more complex consideration of the
evidence than one who persistently rejected any evidence favorable
to the defendant. On this measure, the juror-experts and nonexperts
differed significantly. The juror-experts were significantly less likely
to be one-sided jurors. Among juror-experts, 10.6 percent were in
the one-sided category, but 19.1 percent of nonexpert jurors
96. See Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal Factors
in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 163, 165 (1991).
97. These sixty jurors were distributed across thirty different juries.
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qualified as one-sided.
In the empirical picture that emerges from this aggregate view of
the behavior of the embedded experts, we find that the modern
American jury shows little evidence of overbearing behavior or
undue influence by juror-experts at the aggregate level. Indeed, the
aggregate data suggest that juror-experts as a whole make at least
one unambiguously positive contribution to deliberations in that
they are less likely to take a consistently one-sided view of the
evidence.
Our final approach to assessing the behavior of the juror-experts
comes from a closer examination of the content of the specialized
comments the juror-experts offered in the course of deliberations
and the response from other jurors. (See Table 5). On some occa-
sions, the juror explicitly claimed expertise by announcing the
source of her specialized knowledge in the context of offering a
comment (e.g., “I have a background in real estate, so when they
were talking about mixing up the parcels I’m like, why, how could
you do that with the parcel number?”). On other occasions, the
context or the substance of the comment itself indicated the juror’s
expertise. Context provided the cue to expertise when another juror
explicitly referred to the juror-expert’s occupation in drawing out
the juror-expert’s response (e.g., addressing the radiation therapist
on the jury: “So if you took those [x-rays taken by a chiropractor] to
the neurologist or back to her primary physician, they wouldn’t be
of any value to them?” The radiation therapist’s response: “Probably
not. But, he wouldn’t be able to read them anyway, because he’s not
a radiologist. He’s an M.D.”).98
The specialized content of the comment itself could also provide
evidence that the juror was drawing on occupational expertise if a
juror made a comment with content so specific to his or her
specialized background that only someone with a similar back-
ground would be likely to offer that comment (e.g., the owner of an
auto shop, describing how a seat belt works, explains, “It does not
lock until the car falls forward. It’s on an exocentric system.”). To
ensure that all potential expert-based comments were identified, we
98. These no doubt represent an undercount of elicited juror-expert comments because
they include only those comments elicited with an explicit reference to the juror-expert’s
occupational background.
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included some comments that could conceivably have been made by
a juror without the same occupational background of the juror-
expert (e.g., a juror-expert with a background in law explained:
“Dismissed with prejudice, it cannot be refiled; dismissed without
prejudice, it can be refiled.”). Nonetheless, even with this generous
coding standard, only fifty-nine of the ninety-five juror-experts
made identifiable occupation-related comments and those comments
accounted for a remarkably small percentage (2.3 percent) of the
comments made by juror-experts in deliberations:
Table 5. Specialized Comments Offered by Juror-Experts
Type of Comment  N of Comments
N of Jurors
Who Made
Comments
% Valenced
Self-Identified
Expert Comments
 94 (   0.6%) 39  76.8%
Other Expert-Re-
lated Comments
 281 (   1.7%) 53  47.0%
Remaining
Comments
 15,684 ( 97.7%)  95 42.7%
Total Comments
By Juror Experts
 16,059 (100.0%)  95  42.9%
Out of the total 16,059 comments made by the juror-experts, a
total of ninety-four self-identified comments were offered by thirty-
nine different jurors. Unlike other comments, these self-identified
expert comments were likely to be valenced (76.8 percent), suggest-
ing that the juror was announcing a source of specialized knowledge
as a means of justifying the pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant position
the juror was taking. Here are several of these comments:
Case A: Medical experts gave strongly conflicting testimony on
what caused the plaintiff ’s brain injury. The plaintiff ’s expert, a
medical doctor, claimed that the plaintiff lost oxygen as a result of
how his head was positioned after sustaining a trauma. By the time
the following discussion occurred in deliberations, a number of
jurors had already expressed the view that the plaintiff had not
proved liablity. One juror (Juror 1), however, was not convinced that
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a defense verdict was warranted and a juror-expert (Juror 6),
claiming expertise, addressed her:
Juror 6: Okay, it says in our instructions that we’re supposed to
judge this on the basis of our experience.
Juror 1: We have to be satisfied.
Juror 6: Okay. I’m a physiologist. I have a Ph.D. in physiology,
okay. And I just want to say that to me, the whole thing with
[the plaintiff ’s cause of injury] is totally unsubstantiated.
Juror 3: [nods in agreement]
Juror 6: I ... I as a physiologist cannot believe that a person who
does not have something on top of their head can suffocate just
from having their head down.
Juror 4: [nodding in agreement] Just by ... right.
Juror 6: I’m sorry. I just cannot believe that.
Juror 4: I can’t either, I mean, like we said, we’d have a town full
of brain-injured drunks.
Juror 3: Right. Exactly. How many drunks fall asleep like this.
[putting her head down]
Juror 4: Exactly.
Juror 7: How many times do your children ... my children.
Juror 6: Oh. That’s a good point.
Juror 7: They fall asleep like this. [putting her head down on her
chest]
Juror 5: No kidding.
Juror 7: While we’re driving. They fall asleep and they’re down.
Juror 5: [indicates agreement]
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Juror 6: So I just ... I just don’t buy that with my training and
experience.
Juror 1: There was trauma and maybe something happened with
[the oxygen supply] or something.
Juror 5: No.
Juror 6: No. It’s physiologically impossible.
Juror 1: Ya’ know, you’re talking about a physiologist compared
to an M.D. [plaintiff ’s expert].
Juror 6: Okay, okay, so....
Juror 2: Um, what is medically more reasonable, I think, is the
trauma.
Because most of the jurors had agreed on the cause before this
discussion occurred, we cannot attribute the verdict for the defen-
dant to the juror-expert’s claimed expertise. Indeed, other jurors
responded to the juror-expert’s opinion by offering other confirma-
tory experiences (e.g., a parent noting how children sleep). In any
event, the juror-expert was not effective in persuading Juror 1, who
ended deliberations as a holdout.99
Case B: The issue was whether it was appropriate for a medical
facility to contact former patients to gather some follow-up informa-
tion. Juror 8, a pharmacist, reinforced the majority’s sense that the
follow-up was reasonable and the approach taken by the defendant
was acceptable:
Juror 8: Okay, the way that confidentiality, that, we use it at
work.
Juror 1: [interrupting] Let the pharmacist speak here.
Juror 8: [continuing] for records and things like that.
99. Civil juries in Arizona do not require a unanimous verdict. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-
102C-D (2013).
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Juror 7: Um-hmm.
Juror 8: They did not violate—in my opinion—that they did not
violate confidentiality because, um, I don’t find it unreasonable
for them to say they did a follow-up.
Juror 5: Right.
Juror 8: We do follow-up at work also.
Although several of the jurors were deferential (e.g., “Let the
pharmacist speak here.”), the pharmacist was voicing a view that
had little opposition from the jury.
Case C: The jury had decided to find the defendant liable in an
auto accident, but was questioning the length of the chiropractic
therapy required for the plaintiff. A juror-expert (Juror 1), who
worked in a physical therapy/occupational therapy office, found
support in arguing that the length claimed was too long:
Juror 1: Well, I worked, I worked in a physical therapy office—
Juror 3: Uh huh.
Juror 1: for quite a while. And, I mean, three months for one
patient—
Juror 3: Is a lot.
Juror 1: much less what they are asking for here, would have
been just insane. I mean, we would have sent them back to the
doctor, and had re-x-rays and would not, we would not have
continued with therapy for that long, not fixing anything.
Juror 7: Yeah.
Juror 1: Because even three months would have been too long to
just sit around and wait.
Again, the juror-expert was offering evidence based on experience
to confirm that the jury was on the right track. Had there been an
opposing view, it is difficult to know how the conflict would have
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been resolved.
On other occasions, a juror-expert who claimed the relevance of
his occupational expertise was treated with some disdain by the
other jurors:
Case D: In an employment dispute, a juror-expert repeatedly
recounted his experiences in the workplace and met impatience:
Juror 3: I have one senior supervisor who’s—
Juror 6: Stick to this.
Juror 4: Please.
Juror 5: You have a story for everything. Let’s just stay with
this, if we’re going to get through this.
Finally, on occasion a juror-expert claimed expertise and encoun-
tered overt disagreement:
Case E: The jury in a medical malpractice case discussed whether
the defendant had met the appropriate standard of care. The two
juror-experts with similar medical backgrounds initially disagreed
on whether the defendant had failed to properly monitor and treat
the patient’s condition and whether the patient would have
improved with appropriate care. Both drew on their professional
experience to justify their positions. Juror 3 was initially convinced
that the defendant’s actions did not affect the patient’s outcome
because medical conditions can change suddenly. In contrast, Juror
7 focused on the absence of communication among the medical
personnel and argued that the failure to communicate and alter
treatment was responsible for the bad outcome. The majority of
jurors agreed with Juror 7, but Juror 3 was more fatalistic based on
her experience with patient care:
Juror 3: I took care of a lady, I was sittin’ there talking to her in
a chair and she—
Juror 2: [nods]
Juror 3: was talkin’ to me and then all of a sudden she slumps
in her chair. She had a stroke right in front of me in mid-
sentence.
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And a little later in deliberations:
Juror 2: I think they would’ve gotten things better under control
with the medication—that maybe that would—
Juror 3: [interrupting] See, I have a real problem with that
’cause I think he was gonna have an attack one way or the other.
Juror 2: Not necessarily.
Juror 7: I don’t agree with that.
Juror 3: But I’m just giving my opinion.
Juror 2: I know, I know.
Juror 4: We want to hear it.
Juror 3: But I don’t know if anything could’ve been done, even if
he was on the meds, if it would’ve stopped it.
Eventually, Juror 3 was persuaded to join the other jurors in
finding liability on the grounds that the defendant’s inaction, while
not the only cause, was in fact a cause of the plaintiff ’s outcome.
As the pattern in Table 4 showed, juror-experts in ten cases
encountered an extreme version of opposition that led them to be
holdouts at the end of deliberations, refusing to sign the verdict
form. In five of the cases, a close look at the nature of their disagree-
ment with the verdict revealed that the source of their disagreement
was unrelated to their area of occupational expertise. For example,
a juror-expert with a medical background refused to sign the verdict
form because he would have attributed a higher percentage of
responsibility to the defendant in an automobile accident based on
his belief that the plaintiff had the right of way.
In the remaining five cases, the juror-expert’s occupational
background may have accounted for the juror’s decision to resist the
jury verdict and holdout. In two of those cases, a medical juror-
expert was skeptical about the plaintiff ’s claimed injuries and
refused to agree with the jury’s decision on an award; in a third
case, an engineer wanted to make a modest award (<$10,000) even
lower because he questioned whether the low impact collision had
caused any injury. In a fourth case, a medical juror-expert was
convinced that earlier medical treatment might have made a
difference, but the rest of the jury found the defense expert persua-
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sive in concluding that no earlier intervention would have been
effective. Finally, in the remaining case, the juror-expert’s disagree-
ment was directly linked to his occupation: the holdout juror-expert,
a physical therapist, was persuaded that the car accident had
exacerbated the plaintiff ’s previous injury and would have awarded
her a small amount for the equivalent of four physical therapy
visits. The other jurors found no evidence of injury and awarded
nothing. Thus, in none of these five cases was the juror-expert
effective in convincing the majority to change its position.
In sum, our close analysis did not reveal any instances in which
a juror-expert offered specialized information during deliberations
that led other jurors to change their opinions or preferred verdicts.
Of course, opinions may have been affected by more subtle forms of
influence than we were able to detect. More plausibly, the tiny
proportion of comments that drew on specialized juror knowl-
edge—2.3 percent of all comments made by juror-experts—may
simply not have a big impact on the average jury’s course of
deliberations.
 But even if juror-experts rarely exert substantial influence by
introducing specialized information into deliberations, that
evaluation is only part of the story. We have not yet considered
precisely what behavior is desirable for these jurors. That is, what
should jurors be doing with their specialized knowledge during jury
deliberations?
III. HOW SHOULD JURORS HANDLE SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE?
If expertise is a resource for the jury, should jurors be explicitly
encouraged to share their relevant expertise? Alternatively, if the
educative resource imposes an unacceptable cost from the influence
of unsworn witnesses on deliberations, is there a need for efforts at
greater control over attempts by such jurors to influence delibera-
tions? Or is it appropriate simply to rely on the good sense of the
jury to take this expertise for what it is worth? 
To address these questions, we begin by examining the responses
of experienced judges and attorneys to situations in which jurors
referred to information based on specialized expertise during the
deliberations. We gave the respondents a description of six in-
stances of juror behavior. In each case, we asked whether the juror
was behaving appropriately or inappropriately. As we told respon-
dents, we were interested in learning whether these judges and
attorneys viewed the juror’s behavior as inappropriate, whether or
not the behavior would necessarily lead to a new trial. The respon-
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dents were 68 judges and 60 attorneys attending an annual federal
circuit court conference. All received the same six scenarios with one
exception. There were two versions of the fifth scenario, which
involved an attorney-juror. In one version, the attorney’s advice on
the meaning of the jury instructions was correct; in the second
version, it was incorrect. Table 6 shows the scenarios and the
percentage of respondents who viewed the juror’s behavior as
appropriate.
Table 6. Survey Results on Appropriate Juror Behavior
Please consider the following statements that a juror might
make during deliberations. In each case, indicate whether the
juror was behaving appropriately or inappropriately. (Note that
evidence of inappropriate behavior would not necessarily lead to
a new trial).
Scenario Description Juror behaved appropriately orinappropriately
Scenario 1. In a motor vehicle tort case, a juror who
has worked for an insurance company for 20 years
informs his fellow jurors that any award they make will
not be taxed. (n=128)
Appropriately 14.8%
(Judges = 19.1%)
(Attorneys = 10.4%)
Inappropriately 85.2%
Scenario 2. In a slip and fall case involving a glass
table, the plaintiff ’s expert has taken pictures of the
table. One of the jurors, whose husband is an amateur
photographer, argues that it is easy to alter photographs
so that the pictures cannot be trusted. (n=128)
Appropriately 57.8%
(Judges = 58.8%)
(Attorneys = 56.7%)
Inappropriately 42.2%
Scenario 3. In a tort suit, a physician on the jury con-
vinces her fellow jurors that the medical expert who
testified for the plaintiff was incorrect in claiming that
the plaintiff ’s injury made him more susceptible to the
viral infection he contracted six months after the acci-
dent. (n=127)
Appropriately 38.6% 
(Judges = 44.1%) 
(Attorneys = 32.2%)
Inappropriately 61.4%
Scenario 4. In a motor vehicle tort case, the defense
expert testified that, based on the minimal damage to
the vehicle, the plaintiff could not have received the
severe injuries he was claiming. An artist on the jury
who creates metal sculptures by welding metal compo-
nents, explains that the defense expert is correct be-
cause, as the artist knows, metal of that gauge dents
easily. (n=127)
Appropriately 66.1% 
(Judges = 58.8%)
(Attorneys = 74.6%)
Inappropriately 33.9%
(judges vs. attorneys, p<.10)
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Table 6 cont.
Scenario 5. A lawyer on the jury answers a question
from another juror about the meaning of one of the jury
instructions. His answer is correct/incorrect. (n=127)
Correct v. Incorrect: ( = 9.02, p = .003)
Within correct, judges v. attorneys: ( 4.20, p = .04)
Within incorrect, judges v. attorneys, no difference
Answer Correct:
Appropriately 55.4%
(Judges = 44.7%)
(Attorneys = 70.4%)
Inappropriately 44.6%
Answer Incorrect: 
Appropriately 29.0%
(Judges = 26.7%)
(Attorneys = 31.3%)
Inappropriately 71.0%
Scenario 6. The defendant is on trial for criminally
negligent homicide in connection with the death of his
girlfriend. There is conflicting medical testimony on the
cause of death (repeated punching versus an embolism
stimulated by intercourse too soon after giving birth). A
nurse on the jury offers her professional analysis of the
expert medical testimony. (n=123)
Appropriately 45.5% 
(Judges = 42.9%)
 (Attorneys = 48.3%)
Inappropriately 55.4%
The first four scenarios were based on events that occurred
during deliberations on juries in the Arizona Jury Project.100 The
sixth is based on the New York case of People v. Maragh.101 The
responses to these scenarios reveal little agreement with the
exception of the first scenario. The behavior of the juror who offered
the jury accurate but legally irrelevant information was labeled
inappropriate by 85 percent of respondents. The minority position
in all of the other scenarios captured at least a third of the respon-
dents. The ordering of the scenarios on appropriateness of the
juror’s behavior was fairly comparable for the judges and attorneys
as a whole, although the attorneys were significantly more likely
than the judges to find correct advice on the law given by an
attorney-juror to be appropriate. A majority of both judges and
attorneys found the behavior of the photographer’s spouse and the
metal artist to be appropriate, although the attorneys were
somewhat more accepting; a majority in both groups found the
physician and the nurse to have behaved inappropriately. The
specialized knowledge claimed in the latter two scenarios was both
more technical and specialized, as well as more likely to be influen-
tial in view of the fact that the jurors in both of these cases were
professionals. Finally, whether the respondents viewed the behavior
100. See supra Part II.B.4.
101. See People v. Maragh, 691 N.E.S.2d 918, 919 (App. Div. 1999).
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of the attorney-juror as appropriate depended on whether he turned
out to have given correct or incorrect advice on the law. With this
hindsight102 information, the benefit—or alternatively, the cost—of
his advice was clear.
The variation in response as to what constitutes juror misbehav-
ior may be one reason why appellate courts have struggled—and
differed—in responding to the use of juror expertise when it has
come to their attention.103 The relatively easy-to-administer rule
captured in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and adopted by many
jurisdictions would rule out post-trial intervention in any of these
situations, and yet many of the respondents found the juror’s
behavior inappropriate.
IV. WHAT (IF ANYTHING) SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT JUROR-
EXPERTS?
The evidence from the survey of judges and attorneys presented
in Part III is consistent with the ambivalent response of the legal
system to juror-experts reflected in the case law on those rare
occasions when use of specialized expertise comes to the attention
of a court.104 Thus, these sources provide little guidance on what
steps, if any, should be taken in response to the increased presence
of potential jurors with specialized expertise in the jury venire.105
Two scholars have suggested that the presence of jurors with
specialized knowledge warrants substantial court intervention at
the outset. Professor Paul F. Kirgis draws an analogy to the court’s
gatekeeping obligation, described in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,106 to prevent an unqualified expert from
testifying.107 He concludes that “the only way to guard against
spurious juror expertise is to ensure that jurors do not have
expertise and so cannot misuse it in the jury room.”108 The solution
then is for the court to strike the juror for cause, expanding the
availability of the challenge for cause beyond its traditional use in
102. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight  Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975).
103. See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
104. See supra Part I.
105.  Id.
106. See 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
107. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 527 (2002).
108. Id.
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removing jurors who give an indication that they may be biased.109
Professor Kirgis sees this approach as a way to avoid the high cost
of overturning verdicts post-trial in response to the use of special-
ized information during deliberations.110 He also views the cost of
the challenges for cause in this situation as relatively low, both
because the juror is easily replaced and because the stricken juror
can serve on another case in which his expertise will not be
relevant.111
Similarly, Professor Michael B. Mushlin, acknowledging that his
proposal would constitute a major change in the law, also advocates
expansion of the challenge for cause to make professional expertise
a sufficient basis for removal.112 While Kirgis would expand the
challenge for cause only to professionals who would qualify as
experts,113 Mushlin would use a more expansive definition of juror
expertise, presumably covering a significant portion of the prospec-
tive jurors appearing in some modern jury venires.114 As he explains,
his proposal “is meant to remedy the very real possibility that
professional jurors routinely exert undue influence over trial
outcomes.”115
The expansion of the challenge for cause to remove juror-experts
is a substantial intervention in the jury selection process. Moreover,
it has the effect of reducing heterogeneity on the jury and removing
jurors who, as the deliberations from the Arizona Jury Project
reveal, may make valuable contributions to the deliberation
process.116 And, as the deliberations show,117 the fear that these
jurors “routinely exert undue influence”118 appears to be inflated.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 527-28.
112. Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional
Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL. REV. 239, 272-73 (2007).
113. See Kirgis, supra note 107, at 496 n.24 (describing focus on “those topics of juror
background knowledge that implicate the Daubert principle”).
114. See Mushlin, supra note 112, at 272 (“The law should be changed so that professional
expertise touching on an essential trial issue would, in and of itself, be sufficient cause to
strike a prospective juror.”).
115. Id.
116. See supra Part II.B.2.
117. Id.
118. Mushlin, supra note 112, at 272. Professor Mushlin conducted a survey of twenty-nine
jury consultants, at least three of whom reported instances in which they believed that
professional jurors swayed the jury’s deliberations. Id. at 266-67, 269-70. It is difficult to know
how representative these instances were or whether the reports were accurate, but it is worth
noting that jury consultants are not typically hired for routine cases.
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In response to the value of maximizing heterogeneity on the jury
and the absence of evidence that jurors with specialized knowledge
routinely exert undue influence, we would not favor changes in jury
selection to remove such jurors. Yet we acknowledge the potential
for undue influence from a juror who has neither been qualified as
a testifying expert or been subject to cross-examination to test his
opinions. That danger ought to be addressed.
Jurors currently receive no advice on how to handle their
specialized knowledge.119 In view of the apparent lack of agreement
on what constitutes appropriate juror use of specialized knowledge,
the failure to provide any guidance is perhaps no surprise.120
Instead of guidance, however, jurors are provided with mixed
messages on what behavior is appropriate.121 The ambiguity of the
current situation can leave attentive jurors unsure of what they
should share concerning their own arguably relevant expertise. For
example, here is the reaction of an Arizona Jury Project juror with
medical training to the evidence about the cause of the plaintiff ’s
health problems:
Juror 7: That’s another thing, one of the things I was listening
really carefully ... they didn’t say ... They said two things that
kind of confused me. They said we can bring our experiences ...
to bear and our judgment and they also said you can’t use any
evidence that wasn’t introduced.
Juror 6: Right
Juror 7: Now I can sit here and think a lot about the reasons she
would have a lot of the symptomatology she does ... that they
never said, ‘What about this? What about this [counts on fingers]
you know. Now, can we consider those things?
It seems inappropriate to leave this ambiguity unaddressed. Yet
only New York, in response to People v. Maragh, has attempted to
take on the challenge of striking out through the fog. The courts of
New York have developed a jury instruction that at least acknowl-
edges the expertise that jurors may possess:
119. See supra note 55 for a rare exception involving jurors with language expertise. See
also infra note 123 and accompanying text.
120. See supra Part I.
121. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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Although as jurors you are encouraged to use all of your life
experiences in analyzing testimony and reaching a fair verdict,
you may not communicate any personal professional expertise
you might have or other facts not in evidence to the other jurors
during deliberations. You must base your discussions and
decisions solely on the evidence presented to you during the
trial.122
This approach has two fundamental weaknesses. First, it
assumes that the individual juror possessing specialized knowledge
will be able to distinguish between what she knows as a professional
and what she knows as a knowledgeable layperson. Consider, for
example, the fact that steroids can be an anti-inflammatory used to
treat injuries or a supplement used in body-building. Surely a
health care professional knows this, but so do many people who
have been injured and prescribed a steroidal anti-inflammatory.
Second, following this instruction deprives the jury of the full
contributions of its most knowledgeable members. In addition, it
fails to enlist the full jury in the effort to sensibly examine and
analyze the relevant evidence. An alternative approach would be to
construct a more collaborative instruction that directly warns jurors
about the potential limits of information offered by their fellow
jurors. The result is that jurors with specialized knowledge would
be free to share their relevant expertise, but the jury would be on
notice to guard against uninformed overstepping. An instruction
might look something like the following:
As jurors we expect you to draw on your common sense and
experience in evaluating the evidence. Any background or
experience that you or any other juror has may or may not help
with the evaluation of the evidence.
Please remember that your views and those of your fellow
jurors, whatever their backgrounds, have not been subjected to
the testing of cross-examination in the courtroom.
When any juror claims to know something about the law that
is not in my written instructions to you, you should check with
me. The role of all jurors, even jurors who are lawyers, is to find
the facts. It is not to determine the law. The law must come from
me.123
122. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 1:25A (3d ed. 2013).
123. The Arizona Jury Project had one attorney-juror and a series of paralegals, legal
secretaries, and other jurors who claimed legal expertise, a total of twelve jurors in all, so that
a legal quasi-expert appeared roughly on one jury in four or five. Some of these jurors made
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Our observations of the Arizona juries reveal that when jurors
feel that another juror may be going beyond what the evidence has
shown, they regularly refer to the jury instruction that warns jurors
not to speculate.124 Applying this approach to expertise on the jury
offers a promising way to assist jurors in managing the contribu-
tions of the often valuable, but potentially misleading, juror-expert
in their midst.
inaccurate statements about the law, but none approached the totally inaccurate legal advice
that a New York attorney-juror apparently gave the members of his jury in 23 Jones Street
Associates v. Keebler-Beretta, 676 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (Civ. Ct. 1998), rev’d sub nom. 23 Jones
St. Associates v. Beretta, 699 N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Term 1999), aff ’d, 722 N.Y.S.2d 229 (App.
Div. 2001). The petitioner in a holdover action was a landlord suing the widow of a man who
was the tenant of a rent-controlled apartment when he died. Id. The issue was whether the
widow resided in the apartment as her primary residence during the lifetime of her deceased
husband. Id. Under the law, the widow had the burden of proof, but the attorney-juror
apparently convinced the remaining jurors to change their verdict based on his representation
that the landlord had the burden of proof to show that the widow had not lived in the
apartment with her husband. Id. The trial court ordered a new trial. Id. at 808. Judge Shirley
Werner Kornreich also described the modified instruction that she now gives to avoid this
problem: “I instruct them, both in my preliminary charge and in my closing instruction, that
even if one of their members is an attorney, they cannot accept the law from him or her. I tell
them that as jurors, they are all equal in the jury room, even lawyers, and their role is to find
the facts, not determine the law. I emphasize that the law must come from me alone.” Id. at
804 n.2. The appellate court reinstated the verdict for the widow, expressing the view that the
attorney-juror’s professional experience “was a matter that he naturally brought with him to
the deliberations, and his reliance on knowledge derived from that experience is outside the
realm of impermissible influence.” Beretta, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
124. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law”
in Real Jury Deliberation: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1555
(2012).
